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The price-matching dilemma
Abstract
We characterize when strategic considerations of stores to match prices set by rivals
on branded goods devolve into a prisoner’s dilemma. We consider a setting where stores
also offer generic products, creating incentives to raise prices for branded goods that
compete with generics—to shift consumer purchases toward more profitable generics.
Price-matching guarantees commit stores not to set high prices for branded goods,
thereby attracting more shoppers. When shopping price-elasticities are sufficiently
high, a prisoner’s dilemma results.
1 Introduction
Simple economic reasoning suggests that automatic price-matching guarantees should
help cartels set collusively high prices. The logic is that because any price cuts are matched
automatically, price-matching guarantees should eliminate all incentives to reduce prices.
Papers making this point in a single product setting date back to Hay (1982); Salop (1986)
and Logan and Lutter (1989).1 Indeed, the popular press, as encapsulated by the Economist
magazine, has argued that price-matching will guarantee profits and sustain collusion.2
Our paper develops the strategic foundations for how price-matching guarantees can in-
stead result in price wars and reductions in profits. In our spatial duopoly, each store carries
branded versions of two goods, and a generic (store-brand) alternative to one branded good.
Generics are less costly to produce, providing firms incentives to set higher prices for a
branded good that competes with a generic—to shift consumer purchases toward the more
profitable generic—than for branded goods for which they lack good generic alternatives.3
When stores do not carry generic substitutes for the same branded good, the stores price
their branded goods differently. The same incentives arise when we allow each store to
carry both branded and generic (store-brand) versions of the two goods. The quality of the
generic alternatives varies across stores—each store has a high quality generic version of one
good, and a low quality version of the other, and the quality of the generic substitute for a
branded good differs between the two stores. This heterogeneity in the quality of generics
across stores causes stores to price their branded goods differently.
Our paper shows how this creates a possible role for price-matching guarantees. In prac-
tice, stores carry an array of products and while consumers see price matching guarantees
prior to visiting a store, few consumers see prices of individual goods until they shop. Price-
1Hviid and Shaffer (2010) argue that price-matching should raise prices by even more when combined
with most-favored consumer clauses (MFC) that allow consumers to request refunds if a store lowers its price
within a certain period of time. However, Chen and Liu (2011) find that the introduction of price-matching
and MFC by Best Buy resulted in lower prices in the industry.
2http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21643239-price-match-guarantees-prevent-
rather-provoke-price-wars-guaranteed-profits.
3Salinger (1991) argues that similar pricing incentives could arise when firms vertically integrate, and
the downstream firm carries rival products. The downstream firm might increase the prices of rival products
to divert consumption toward the product of its upstream firm. Luco and Marshall (2017) find that the
vertical integrations of "The Coca Cola Company" and "PepsiCo" with their bottlers resulted to lower
prices for Coca Cola and PepsiCo products, and higher prices for rival products, such as Dr Pepper.
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matching guarantees allow stores to reassure consumers that they will not be ‘ripped off’ by
higher-priced branded products if they visit a store. Price-matching commits stores not to
charge higher prices than a rival for its branded goods when the incentives to price branded
good higher differ across stores due to the cross-store heterogeneity in the qualities of their
generics. In turn, reductions in branded good prices encourage stores to further reduce prices
of generics to shift consumer purchases toward generics.
In this way, price-matching commits a store to lower prices, which attracts more shoppers.
We show that when travel to a store is sufficiently cheap so that consumer choice of where
to shop is sensitive to prices, stores become trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma: Store profits
would be higher if neither store matched, but price-matching is a strictly dominant strategy,
as the attraction of drawing more shoppers by price-matching more than compensates for
lower prices. For intermediate travel costs, a Stag-Hunt game arises: neither store wants to
initiate price-matching unless it thinks that a rival will. Only when travel is expensive do
stores lack incentives to price-match.
Motivation for our analysis comes from the experiences of major supermarket chains
in the UK—Tesco, Sainsbury’s and Waitrose. In the past decade, these chains adopted
the strategy of offering price-matching guarantees on branded products, promising to match
lower prices of competitors on branded products, but not generic alternatives.4 For example,
under Tesco’s policy, daily prices are collected from competitors, and differences between its
prices of branded products and those of its competitors are automatically refunded to con-
sumers at checkout.5 A long-running price war ensued.6 Profits and share prices fell sharply,
as highlighted by newspaper articles with titles like, ‘the new grocery price war could destroy
4ASDA and Morrison’s offer superficially similar, but distinct, price pledges (Arbatskaya et al.
(2004)). ASDA employs a price-beating pledge (https://www.asdapriceguarantee.co.uk/terms.html), and
Morrison’s used to award points to consumers based on how much cheaper a shopping basket was at a rival
(https://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/oct/09/changes-to-morrisons-match-more-loyalty-scheme). We
thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
5Tesco offers the price-matching guarantee only if at least ten products are purchased
and limits reimbursement to £20 (https://secure.tesco.com/brandguarantee). Waitrose guaran-
tees to price-match Tesco for 1,000 branded products that its consumers use most frequently
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/9242654/Waitrose-extends-price-
match-guarantee-with-Tesco.html). Sainsbury’s used to automatically issue a voucher for the difference in
the prices of its branded goods, and the lowest of prices at ASDA and Tesco, redeemable at the next visit.
(https://www.theguardian.com/money/2013/mar/11/supermarket-deals-price-promises-match-up).
6http://marketing-sciences.com/price-matching-history-whats-supermarket-wars/.
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the supermarkets’ (http://www.fool.co.uk/investing/2016/08/03/the-new-grocery-price-war-could-
destroy-the-supermarkets/ ). While this period of time was marked by other changes to the
UK supermarket industry, including increased competition from low cost entrants, our model
reconciles the price matching, which, in turn, can explain some of the profit decline.
Other explanations for why price-match guarantees are offered or can be ineffective do
not hold in the UK setting. With automatic price discounts, consumers do not bear hassle
costs (Hviid and Shaffer (1999)); price-matching does not discriminate between informed
and uninformed consumers (Png and Hirshleifer (1987), Corts (1996)); and in costly search
or information acquisition settings, price-matching reduces optimal consumer search and
information acquisition, leading to higher prices and profits (Moorthy and Winter (2006),
Yankelevich and Vaughan (2016)). Coughlan and Shaffer (2009) is the sole paper to consider
multiple products; and it focuses on how shelf space and product differentiability affect the
profitability of price-matching guarantees, and not the strategic effects of generic alternatives.
We next lay out the model in which each store offers a single generic that differs across
stores. We characterize pricing with and without price-matching. We then analyze consumer
choice of where to shop, and derive store profits with and without price-matching. A char-
acterization of equilibrium outcomes follows. We conclude with a discussion of robustness.
In particular, as we establish in the appendix that the same mechanisms and results apply
when stores offer multiple generics, of heterogeneous qualities. Proofs are in an Appendix.
2 Model
Our spatial model features two stores located at opposite ends of the unit interval. Store
T is located at 0, and store S is located 1. Each store carries branded versions of goods 1
and 2, denoted B1 and B2. Store T carries a generic substitute to B1, denoted G1,T , and
store S carries a generic substitute to B2, denoted G2,S. The marginal cost of producing
branded goods is c > 0, while generics are costless to produce.
Figure 1: Spatial Economy
0 1{T ; {B1, B2, G1,T}} {S; {B1, B2, G2,S}}
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A measure one of consumers is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. To travel distance d,
consumers incur cost αm(d), where m′(d) > 0, m′′(d) ≥ 0, and α > 0. Consumers value
at most one unit of each good, and utility is separable across the two goods. Valuations
of branded goods are independently and identically uniformly distributed across consumers
with VBi ∼ U [0, 1] for good i = 1, 2. With probability 1− γ, a consumer values a generic as
much as its branded counterpart, i.e., VGi = VBi, but with probability γ ∈ (0, 1), she only
values a generic at VGi = βVBi, where β < 1.
Stores only sell the generic to consumers who discount it if the branded good is suffi-
ciently costly to produce relative to how much consumers discount the generic (1− β), and
the likelihood 1− γ that they do not discount the generic. Assumption 1 details a sufficient
condition for firms sell to some consumers who discount the generic:
Assumption 1. c >
√
(1− β)3 (1− γ) /(β (γ + β (1− β) (1− γ)) ).
Consumers only see a store’s prices and learn their valuations for goods when they visit
the store. This creates a potential role for price-matching guarantees that commit stores
to setting prices on branded goods that do not exceed those set by rivals. The assumption
that consumers do not learn their valuations until they visit a store simplifies analysis; our
qualitative findings do not hinge on this assumption.
Timing. At stage 1, each store announces whether it will price-match its rival’s branded
goods prices, and sets prices. Consumers see price-match announcements, but not prices. At
stage 2, consumers form beliefs about prices and valuations, and decide which store to visit.
At stage 3, consumers visit stores, see prices, learn valuations and make purchase decisions.
We use the function δj to indicate whether store j ∈ {T, S} price-matches: δj = 1
if it price-matches and δj = 0 if it does not. Store T ’s strategy is given by the vector
{δT , pT (δT )}, where pT (δT ) = {pB1T (δT ) , pB2T (δT ) , pG1T (δT )}, and store S’s strategy is given
by {δS, pS (δS)}, where pS (δS) = {pB1S (δS) , pB2S (δS) , pG2S (δS)}.
Consumers form expectations pe (δT , δS) = {peT (δT ) , peS (δS)} about prices. Consumers
make two decisions. First, based on price-matching announcements, expected prices, and
location d, a consumer chooses a store to visit, σ1 (d, pe (δT , δS)) ∈ {T, S}. Then, once at
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store j ∈ {T, S}, a consumer sees in-store prices, learns her valuations of branded goods,
VB = {VB1, VB2} and whether she discounts generics, b ∈ {0, 1}. Given this information, the
consumer makes her purchase choices, σ2 (VB, b, pj (δj)). We solve the model recursively.
In-store consumer behavior. Consider a consumer who visits store T , sees prices pT (δT ) =
{pB1T (δT ) , pB2T (δT ) , pG1T (δT )}, and learns that her branded good valuations are VB = {VB1, VB2}.
We verify below that, in equilibrium, stores set lower prices for generics, i.e., pB1T (δT ) ≥
pG1T (δT ). Thus, a consumer who does not discount the generic never buys the branded ver-
sion, and she buys the generic version if and only if VGi(= VBi) ≥ pGiT . A consumer who
values the branded good B1 at VB1 and discounts the generic obtains utility VB1 − pB1T (δT )
from purchasing B1 and βVB1− pG1T (δT ) from purchasing G1,T . Thus, the consumer opts for
the branded version if and only if
VB1 − pB1T (δT ) > max
{
0, βVB1 − pG1T (δT )
}
. (1)
Switching from the branded good to the generic results in a consumption utility loss of
(1− β)VB1, but saves the consumer pB1T (δT )− pG1T (δT ) ≥ 0. The loss in utility from down-
grading to the generic is proportional to a consumer’s valuation—higher valuation consumers
lose more—but the savings from the price difference do not vary with a consumer’s valuation.
Hence, we can express condition (1) in terms of the valuations of consumers who opt for the
branded good. Consumer types with high valuations
VB1 ≥ V˜B1 (δT ) = max
{
pB1T (δT ),
pB1T (δT )− pG1T (δT )
1− β
}
, (2)
opt for the branded good, while those with intermediate valuations
VB1 ∈ [pG1T (δT ) /β, V˜B1 (δT )], (3)
select the generic (when β is large enough that pB1T (δT ) > pG1T (δT ) /β). When pB1T (δT ) >
pG1T (δT ) /β some consumers who discount generics buy it, and the consumer who is indiffer-
ent between B1 and G1,T has valuation V˜B1 (δT ) =
(
pB1T (δT )− pG1T (δT )
)
/ (1− β). Absent of
a generic substitute, a consumer buys B2 at store T if and only if VB2 ≥ pB2T (δT ).
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Store Pricing. Ex ante, consumers only differ in their spatial locations. Given price-
matching announcements (δT , δS), there is a unique consumer location d (δT , δS;α) such that
store T attracts consumers located at d < d (δT , δS;α), and store S attracts consumers lo-
cated at d > d (δT , δS;α). Consider store T . In-store prices affect purchase decisions of
consumers at the store, but not which consumers visit. This is because consumer choices
of where to shop are based on their locations, and expected valuations and prices; while
purchasing decisions are determined by realized valuations and in-store prices. Because
the distribution of valuations does not vary with a consumer’s location, the position of the
marginal consumer simply scales profits and does not affect a store’s price choices. Similarly,
store S’s price-matching policy does not affect store T ’s pricing since it does not alter the
distribution of consumer valuations at store T or impose constraints on store T ’s pricing.
As a result, store T ’s profit takes a simple form—it is given by the measure d (δT , δS;α) of
consumers that visit it times the (expected) profit per consumer, piT (δT ):
ΠT (δT , δS) = d (δT , δS;α) piT (δT ) . (4)
When store T prices so that some consumers who discount its generic buy it, i.e., when
pB1T (δT ) > p
G
1T (δT ) /β, then V˜B1 =
(
pB1T (δT )− pGiT (δT )
)
/ (1− β). Substituting for V˜B1 re-
veals that store T ’s expected profit per customer is:
piT (δT ) = γ
[(
pB1T (δT )− c
)(
1− p
B
1T (δT )− pG1T (δT )
1− β
)
+ pG1T (δT )
(
pB1T (δT )− pG1T (δT )
1− β −
pG1T (δT )
β
)]
+ (1− γ) [pG1T (δT ) (1− pG1T (δT ))]+ pB2T (δT ) (1− pB2T (δT )) . (5)
Expected profit per consumer for store S, piS (δS), is defined analogously.
Proposition 1. (no price-matching) Under Assumption 1, if store j ∈ {T, S} does not
price-match, it sets the price of its generic at its stand-alone monopoly price, the price of
the competing branded above its stand-alone monopoly price, and the price of the branded
without a competing generic at its stand-alone monopoly price. Store T sets prices:
pG1T (0) =
β
2 (β + γ (1− β)) , p
B
1T (0) =
1 + c
2
+ pG1T (0)−
β
2
, pB2T (0) =
1 + c
2
. (6)
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The stark monopoly pricing result reflects that no consumer sees prices before shopping. If
a few consumers see prices before shopping, then price competition rises, causing stores to re-
duce prices, but they still raise prices of branded goods to induce consumers to switch to pur-
chasing generic versions by amounts that hinge on the heterogeneous qualities of the generics.
A monopolist charges the stand-alone monopoly price of (1 + c) /2 when she only offers
the branded version of a good. When a generic substitute is also offered, the store charges
more than this monopoly price in order to induce some consumers who discount generics,
and who would otherwise buy the branded good, to instead purchase the generic, which is
cheaper to produce.7 A sufficient condition for a store to sell the branded good is 1− β > c,
which says that it is efficient to sell the branded good to high valuation consumers rather
than the discounted generic.
In contrast, the generic is priced at its stand-alone monopoly price. The marginal con-
sumer of the branded version is indifferent between the branded and the generic alternative.
Increasing the price of the branded version diverts consumers to the generic, but it does not
cause consumers to drop out. Consequently, marginal increases in pG1T are completely passed
on to the price of the branded good, so that pB1T (0) = pG1T (0) + (1− β + c) /2. Thus, the
marginal effects of pG1T are the same as if it were a stand-alone monopoly good.8
When some discounters buy a generic, its price rises with β, i.e., when consumers dis-
count it by less. Competing branded good pricing is more nuanced: the price of a branded
good is a non-monotonic function of β. Higher values of β raise a generic’s price, which is
a force for raising the price of its branded analogue. However, when β is higher, the quality
upgrade (1− β) from the generic to the branded good is lower, which reduces the premium
that a store can charge for the branded good. This latter effect dominates unless consumers
discount the generic so sharply that β < √γ/ (1 +√γ). In particular, β ≥ 1/2 ensures that
pB1T (0) always decreases in β.
Proposition 1 extends readily to allow for asymmetric generic quality across stores, for
example if βS > βT so that store S’s generic is better. Regardless of generic quality, stores
7To see that pB1T (0) > (1 + c) /2, notice that p
G
1T (0) > β/2 for γ < 1.
8This extends more generally as long as no consumer of the branded good is on the cusp of not buying.
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set higher prices for the branded good that competes with its generic, creating a potential
role for price-matching guarantees.
Now suppose that store j commits to matching its rival’s branded good prices, so that
consumers pay the lower of the two stores’ prices. Then, branded good prices are given by
pB1j (1) = min
{
pB1T (0) , p
B
1S (0)
}
=
1 + c
2
pB2j (1) = min
{
pB2T (0) , p
B
2S (0)
}
=
1 + c
2
. (7)
Because firms price branded goods with competing generics more highly, and stores sell dif-
ferent generics (or more generally, the qualities of their generics differ), the stores price their
branded goods differently, creating a potential role for price-matching guarantees.
Proposition 2. (price-matching) Under Assumption 1, when store j ∈ {T, S} commits
to price-match, the price of the branded good for which price-matching bind falls to the stand-
alone monopoly price, inducing the store to reduce the price of its generic analogue. The price
of a branded good for which price-matching does not bind is unchanged by price-matching.
Price-matching puts downward pressure on prices: absent price-matching, stores induce
consumers to buy the generic by charging higher prices for branded goods that compete with
a generic. Price-matching effectively delegates some of a store’s pricing to its rival, commit-
ting the store to charging the rival’s lower price on a branded good. In turn, to induce
consumers to switch to the generic, the store reduces the price of the competing generic.
Price-matching lowers prices which reduces expected profit per consumer, but increases ex-
pected consumer surplus, and thus, consumer base. The store will price-match only when
the latter increase is large enough to swamp the reduced profit per consumer.
Consumer Choice of Store and Store Profits. When deciding which store to visit, a
consumer does not know her valuations, and her forecasts of prices only hinge on whether a
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store price matches or not. The expected consumer surplus from visiting store T is
U (peT (δT )) = γ
ˆ 1
pBe
1T (δT )−p
Ge
1T (δT )
1−β
(
VB1 − pBe1T (δT )
)
dVB1 +
ˆ pBe1T (δT )−pGe1T (δT )
1−β
pGe
1T (δT )
β
(
VB1 − pGe1T (δT )
)
dVB1

+ (1− γ)
[ˆ 1
pGe1T (δT )
(
VG1 − pGe1T (δT )
)
dVG1
]
+
[ˆ 1
pBe2T (δT )
(
VB2 − pBe2T (δT )
)
dVB2
]
A consumer located at d derives expected utility from visiting store T of U (peT (δT )) −
αm (d) . The expected utility from visiting store S, U (peS (δS))−αm (1− d), is defined anal-
ogously. We assume that travel is sufficiently cheap that αm (1/2) ≤ U (peT (0)), i.e., all
consumers are willing to visit a store in equilibrium, even if the stores do not price match.
Given price-matching announcements (δT , δS), a consumer located at d visits store T if
U (δT , δS) ≡ U (peT (δT ))− U (peS (δS)) ≥ α (m (d)−m (1− d)) ≡ αM (d) . (8)
Conversely, she visits store S if U (δT , δS) < αM (d), where M (d) is strictly increasing in d,
with M (1/2) = 0. In equilibrium, expected prices equal in-store prices. When either both
stores price-match or no store price-matches, expected consumer surplus is the same in each
store, i.e. U (0, 0) = U (1, 1) = 0. If only store T price-matches (δT = 1, δS = 0), then prices
in store T are expected to be lower than in store S, so U (1, 0) > 0 > U (0, 1).
Given price-matching announcements (δT , δS), the indifferent consumer is located at
d (δT , δS;α). When both stores announce the same price-matching policy, they offer the same
expected consumer surplus (i.e., U (δT , δS) = 0 for δT = δS ∈ {0, 1}), and consumers visit the
closest store, so d (0, 0;α) = d (1, 1;α) = 1/2. When neither store price-matches, profits are
ΠT (0, 0) = ΠS (0, 0) =
1
2
pi (0) , (9)
and when both price-match,
ΠT (1, 1) = ΠS (1, 1) =
1
2
pi (1) . (10)
When only store T price-matches, U (δT , δS) = U (1, 0) > 0. Condition (8) then implies
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that there exists an α > 0, such that for α < α, travel is so cheap that all consumers visit
store T ; and when α > α, there exists a location d (1, 0;α) ∈ (1/2, 1] of a consumer who is
indifferent between the two stores.
Travel costs rise with α causing more consumers to choose store based on distance rather
than price, shifting d (1, 0;α) toward 1/2. Store profits are
ΠT (1, 0) = d (1, 0;α) pi (1) , ΠS (1, 0) = (1− d (1, 0;α))pi (0) . (11)
By symmetry, when only store S price-matches (δT = 0, δS = 1), the indifferent consumer
is located at d (0, 1;α) = 1− d (1, 0;α), and store profits are
ΠT (0, 1) = d (0, 1;α) pi (0) and ΠS (0, 1) = (1− d (0, 1;α))pi (1) .
Equilibrium. We now show how the number and nature of equilibria hinge on the travel
cost parameter α that determines the price-elasticities of consumer shopping choices.
Proposition 3. There exist αM and αN , with αN > αM , such that for α < αM , price-
matching is a strictly dominant strategy, and in the unique equilibrium both stores price-
match. If α > αN , then in the unique equilibrium neither store price-matches. Finally, if
α ∈ [αM , αN], then two equilibria exist, one where both stores price-match, and one where
neither store price-matches. Firm profits are strictly lower in the price-matching equilibrium.
When store S does not price-match, store T price-matches if the profit d (1, 0;α) pi (1)
exceeds that from not matching pi (0) /2. Similarly, when store S price-matches, store T
price-matches if pi (1) /2 ≥ d (0, 1;α) pi (0), where d (0, 1;α) = 1− d (1, 0;α). Since profit per
consumer without price-matching pi (0) exceeds that with price-matching pi (1), we have
(
1− d (1, 0;αN)) pi (0) = 1
2
pi (1) <
1
2
pi (0) = d
(
1, 0;αM
)
pi (1) .
Rearranging yields
d
(
1, 0;αN
)
= 1− 1
2
pi (1)
pi (0)
<
1
2
pi (0)
pi (1)
= d
(
1, 0;αM
)
,
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Figure 2: Linear and Quadratic Travel Costs
d (1, 0;α) pi (1)
pi (0) /2
pi (1) /2
d (0, 1;α) pi (0)
αNαM α
Π (α)
For a store to want to initiate price-matching rather than just want to retaliate to price-
matching by a rival, shopping choices must be more price elastic, i.e., α must be smaller,
αN > αM . This reflects that if a rival price-matches, then a store loses pi(0) from each
consumer who switches to its rival, but it only gains pi (1) from each consumer who switches
to it when it matches.
Figure 2 depicts store T ’s profit when travel costs are linear or quadratic. Shopping elas-
ticity decreases in α: d (1, 0;α) and d (0, 1;α) decrease and increase in α, respectively. When
α < αM , travel is sufficiently cheap that price matching generates enough business-stealing
effects that a Prisoner’s Dilemma emerges: stores would rather not price-match to get profit
pi(0)/2, but a commitment to lower prices increases the consumer base by enough to make a
unilateral deviation to price matching profitable (i.e., d (1, 0;α) pi (1) > pi (0) /2). Retaliating
to price-matching is even more attractive, so stores end up price-matching and only earning
pi(1)/2 (i.e., d (0, 1;α) pi (0) < pi (1) /2).
When α ∈ [αM , αN ], shopping elasticities are not high enough for a store to unilaterally
give up on unconstrained monopoly profits pi(0)/2 (i.e., d (1, 0;α) pi (1) < pi (0) /2). However,
enough consumers respond to price-matching that when a rival is expected to price-match,
retaliation is optimal (i.e. d (0, 1;α) pi (0) < pi (1) /2). Hence, which equilibrium prevails
hinges on beliefs about a rival’s actions.
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Finally, when α > αN , travel is costly enough that even if a rival is expected to price-
match, retaliation would not be optimal because it would not attract enough customers.
3 Concluding Discussion
Simple reasoning suggests that firms should be able to support collusively high prices by
offering price guarantees that commit them to matching lower prices set by rivals. Nonethe-
less, in recent years, when most major UK supermarkets offered to match the prices set by ri-
vals for branded goods, price wars and large profit losses ensued. We reconcile such outcomes
in a setting where consumers see whether stores offer price-matching guarantees, but only see
prices when they go to a store, and stores offer generic products that are less costly to pro-
duce. Price-matching guarantees commit stores not to set high prices for branded goods that
compete with their generics, thereby attracting more shoppers. We show that when travel
is inexpensive, so that consumer choice of where to shop is price elastic, then in the unique
equilibrium, a prisoner’s dilemma results in which supermarkets have a dominant strategy to
price-match. For intermediate shopping elasticities, two equilibria exist—a low profit equi-
librium in which all stores price match, and a high profit equilibrium in which no store does.
Only when travel is sufficiently costly is the high profit, no-price matching equilibrium unique.
The keys for our results are that (1) consumers only see price-matching guarantees (not
prices) prior to choosing a store, and (2) absent price-matching, stores set different prices,
creating a price-lowering effect when stores commit to matching lower branded prices set by a
rival. Thus, our qualitative findings extend when consumers know their valuations before vis-
iting a store, as in Rhodes (2015). In the appendix, we establish that our results also extend
when stores carry generic substitutes for both branded goods, but, for example, store T has
a high quality generic substitute for good 1, and a lower quality substitute for good 2, while
store S has the opposite generic product composition. The key is that stores will differ accord-
ing to which branded good they price more highly, creating a role for price-match guarantees.
Our findings extend in expected ways if stores are asymmetrically situated. For example,
if one store has a larger market (e.g., if stores are located at 0 and 1, and consumers are
distributed on [0, 1+]), then it is more reluctant than the smaller store to price match. As a
result, when market sizes are similar, then in any equilibrium, stores behave symmetrically,
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and the strategic considerations of the smaller store determine the cutoffs for possible equi-
librium outcomes. When markets differ by more, an equilibrium may exist for intermediate
shopping elasticities in which only the small store matches prices.
Similar characterizations obtain when stores only carry one generic, but the quality of
their generics differ. When βS > βT ≥ 12 , store S will set a lower price for the branded
good that competes with its generic than will store T . When there are enough discounters,
store S offers greater consumer surplus (in the absence of price matching guarantees), as its
branded good prices are lower and its generic quality higher. This raises the relative attrac-
tion to store T of price matching. As a result, when generic qualities are sufficiently similar,
then in any equilibrium, stores behave symmetrically, and the strategic considerations of
store T with the inferior generic determine the cutoffs for possible equilibrium outcomes.
When generic qualities differ by more, an equilibrium may exist for intermediate shopping
elasticities in which only store T matches prices.
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Appendix A: Multiple/Overlapping Generics Substitutes
We extend our analysis to consider overlapping generic substitutes. Both stores carry
branded goods B1 and B2. Store T carries a high-quality generic substitute to B1, denoted
G1,T , and a low-quality generic substitute to B2, denoted G2,T . Store S carries a low-quality
generic substitute to B1, denoted G1,S, and a high-quality substitute to B2, denoted G2,S.
Consumers who discount generics value a high-quality generic at VGi = βHVBi, and a low-
quality generic at VGi = βLVBi, where βL < βH < 1. We also assume that 1−βH > c, so that
it is efficient for the highest valuation consumers to purchase the branded version even when
the substitute is a high quality generic. This ensures that stores want to sell both branded
goods. Assumption 2 is the analogue of Assumption 1, ensuring that stores sell both types
of generics to some consumers who discount them.
Assumption 2. c >
√
(1− βL)3 (1− γ) /
(
βL (γ + βL (1− βL) (1− γ))
)
.
Information and timing is as before: when deciding which store to visit, a consumer
does not know her valuations, and her forecasts of prices only hinge on whether a store price
matches or not. Thus, in-store consumer behavior is given by conditions 2 and 3, substituting
for the relevant β. For example, in store T , consumers who discount generics with valuations
VB1 ≥ V˜B1 (δT ) = max
{
pB1T (δT ),
pB1T (δT )− pG1T (δT )
1− βH
}
, (12)
opt for the branded version of good 1, while those with intermediate valuations
VB1 ∈ [pG1T (δT ) /βH , V˜B1 (δT )], (13)
select the generic version (when βH is large enough that pB1T (δT ) > pG1T (δT ) /βH), while
consumers who do not discount generics always buy the generic version. Consumer choices
of branded and generic versions of good 2 follow similarly, replacing βH by βL.
Store T ’s profit again equals the measure d (δT , δS;α) of consumers that visit it times
the (expected) profit per consumer, piT (δT ): ΠT (δT , δS) = d (δT , δS;α) · piT (δT ). Assuming
pBiT (δT ) > p
G
iT (δT ) /βi for i = {1, 2} holds so that some discounters buy the generic, store
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T ’s expected profit per customer is:
piT (δT ) = γ
[(
pB1T (δT )− c
)(
1− p
B
1T (δT )− pG1T (δT )
1− βH
)
+ pG1T (δT )
(
pB1T (δT )− pG1T (δT )
1− βH −
pG1T (δT )
βH
)
+
(
pB2T (δT )− c
)(
1− p
B
2T (δT )− pG2T (δT )
1− βL
)
+ pG2T (δT )
(
pB2T (δT )− pG2T (δT )
1− βL −
pG2T (δT )
βL
)]
+ (1− γ) [pG1T (δT ) (1− pG1T (δT ))+ pG2T (δT ) (1− pG2T (δT ))] . (14)
Expected profit per consumer for store S, piS (δS), is defined analogously.
Demand independence in the two goods means that, absent of price-matching, optimal
pricing in the multiple-generic case is a simple extension of Proposition 1.
Proposition 4. (no price-matching-multiple-generics) Under Assumption 2, if store
j ∈ {T, S} does not price-match, it prices its generics at their stand-alone monopoly prices,
and it prices branded goods above their stand-alone monopoly prices. Store T sets prices:
pG1T (0) =
βH
2 (βH + γ (1− βH)) , p
B
1T (0) = p
G
1T (0) +
1 + c− βH
2
,
pG2T (0) =
βL
2 (βL + γ (1− βL)) , p
B
2T (0) = p
G
2T (0) +
1 + c− βL
2
. (15)
Both branded goods are priced above their stand-alone monopoly price to induce product
switching towards the generic substitute.
When store j price-matches its rival’s branded good prices, the branded good prices are
pB1j (1) = min
{
pB1T (0) , p
B
1S (0)
}
, pB2j (1) = min
{
pB2T (0) , p
B
2S (0)
}
. (16)
As Proposition 4 details, the heterogeneity across stores in the qualities of their generics
ensures that the stores will price their branded goods differently, giving rise to a potential
role for price-matching guarantees.
Proposition 5. (price-matching-multiple-generics) Under Assumption 2, when a store
commits to price-match, the price falls for the branded good for which price-matching binds.
The price of its generic analogue also falls. Prices of the branded and generic versions of
the good for which price-matching does not bind equal their levels absent price-matching.
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The intuition is identical to the single generic case: price-matching puts downward pres-
sure on prices forcing the store to reduce the price of its competing generic in order to induce
consumers to switch from the branded version to the generic.
Price-matching increases expected consumer surplus, which at store T is given by
U (peT (δT )) = γ
ˆ 1
pBe
1T (δT )−p
Ge
1T (δT )
1−βH
(
VB1 − pBe1T (δT )
)
dVB1 +
ˆ pBe1T (δT )−pGe1T (δT )
1−βH
pGe
1T (δT )
βH
(
VB1 − pGe1T (δT )
)
dVB1
+
ˆ 1
pBe
2T (δT )−p
Ge
2T (δT )
1−βL
(
VB2 − pBe2T (δT )
)
dVB2 +
ˆ pBe2T (δT )−pGe2T (δT )
1−βL
pGe
2T (δT )
βL
(
VB2 − pGe2T (δT )
)
dVB2

+ (1− γ)
[ˆ 1
pGe1T (δT )
(
VG1 − pGe1T (δT )
)
dVG1 +
ˆ 1
pGe2T (δT )
(
VG2 − pGe2T (δT )
)
dVG2
]
.
That is, given price-matching reduces profit per consumer, a store will price-match only if
it increases expected consumer surplus, and thus its consumer base.
As with a single generic, a consumer located at d visits store T when given the price-
matching announcements (δT , δS), inequality (8) holds; i.e., expected consumer surplus dif-
ference between the store exceeds the difference in travel costs. Similarly, store profits for the
different price-match announcements are given by equations (9)-(11). Hence, the qualitative
findings and intuition of our main result in Proposition 3 extends to this multi-generic setting.
Appendix B: Proofs
Lemma 1. If c > (1−β)
2(1−γ)
γ+β(1−β)(1−γ) inequality p
B
ij (δj) > p
G
ij (δj) /β holds so that store j = {T, S}
sells generic good i = {1, 2} to some consumers who discount it at price
pGij (δj) =
β
(
1 + 2pBij (δj) γ + β (1− γ)− γ (1 + c)
)
2 (γ + β (1− β) (1− γ)) . (17)
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider store T . Assuming pBiT (δT ) > pGiT (δT ) /β, then given pBit (δT ),
the first-order condition of profit (5) with respect to pGiT (δT ) is
∂piT (δT )
∂pGiT (δT )
= γ
[(
pBiT (δT )− c− pGiT (δT )
) 1
1− β +
(
pBiT (δT )− pGiT (δT )
1− β −
pGiT (δT )
β
)
− p
G
iT (δT )
β
]
+ (1− γ) [1− 2pGiT (δT )] = 0. (18)
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As the generic’s price is raised, among discounters (first square brackets), some switch to
the branded good (first term), some still buy the generic (second term), and the marginal
consumer ceases buying (third term). The term for non-discounters (second square brackets)
reflects typical monopoly considerations. Simplifying, yields equation (17).
It is easily shown that if c > (1−β)
2(1−γ)
γ+β(1−β)+(1−γ) , then, for p
B
1T (δT ) less than pB1T (0) in Proposi-
tion 1, inequality pBij (δj) > pGij (δj) /β holds. In such case, the utility loss for the marginal dis-
counter from switching from branded to generic (1− β) V˜G = (1− β) pGiT (δT ) /β is less than
the price discount pBiT (δT )− pGiT (δT ), ensuring that some discounters buy the generic.
Proof of Proposition 1: Store T chooses {pBiT (0), pGiT (0)}i=1,2 to maximize profit per
consumer piT (0). Assuming pBiT (0) > pG1T (0) /β holds, then the first-order condition with
respect to pBiT (0) is
∂piT (0)
∂pBiT (0)
=
(
1− p
B
iT (0)− pGiT (0)
1− β
)
− (pBiT (0)− c− pGiT (0)) 11− β = 0.
The first term reflects the first-order effect of an increase in price, a higher price is received.
The second term reflects the product switch effect as the marginal consumer switches to the
generic following an increase in the price of branded good Bi, pBiT (0). Simplifying, yields
pBiT (0) = p
G
1T (0) +
1− β + c
2
. (19)
Setting δT = 0 in Lemma 1 gives the price of the generic. Combining (19) and (17) yields
pGiT (0) =
β
2 (β + γ (1− β)) . (20)
pBiT (0) = p
G
iT (0) +
1 + c− β
2
=
1 + c
2
+ (1− γ) (1− β) pG1T (0) . (21)
Instead, store T can set pBiT (0) = (1 + c) /2 and pGiT (0) = 1/2 with only non-discounters buy-
ing the generic. For c >
√
(1− β)3 (1− γ) /(β (γ + β (1− γ)) ), the store wants to sell the
generic to discounters, while c > (1− β)2 (1− γ) /(γ+β (1− γ) ) implies pB1T (0) > pG1T (0) /β
(i.e., discounters buy generic). Both inequalities are implied by Assumption 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider store T . Price-matching binds for good 1, thus condi-
tion (7) implies pB1T (1) = (1 + c) /2. Since pB1T (1) < pB1T (0), Lemma 1 implies that pG1T (1) <
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pG1T (0), provided some discounters buy the generic. In fact, routine algebra reveals that
pG1T (1) =
(
γ + β (1− β) (1− γ)
γ + β (1− β) (1− γ)2
)
pG1T (0)
As before the store can instead set pBiT (1) = (1 + c) /2 and pGiT (1) = 1/2 with only non-
discounters buying generic. If (and only if) Assumption 1 holds the store wants to lower
the price of the generic to sell the generic to discounters. For c > (1− β)2 (1− γ) /(γ +
β (1− β) (1− γ) ), pB1T (1) > pG1T (1) /β holds (i.e., discounters buy generic). The latter con-
dition on c is implied by Assumption 1. Thus, both prices are lowered to sell the generic to
discounters.
Proof of Proposition 3: Given symmetry, it suffices to characterize either store’s best re-
sponse. If neither store price-matches, then the indifferent consumer is located at d (0, 0;α) =
1/2 and store T earns profit ΠT (0, 0) = pi (0) /2. If store T deviates to price-matching, then
it earns profit ΠT (1, 0) = d (1, 0;α) pi (1), where d (1, 0;α) > 1/2. Store T wants to deviate
to price-match, when store S does not price-match, if(
d (1, 0;α)− 1
2
)
pi (1)+
1
2
pi (1) ≥ 1
2
pi (0)⇔ d (1, 0;α) ≥ d (1, 0;αM) = 1
2
(
1 +
pi (0)− pi (1)
pi (1)
)
.
Here pi (0) > pi (1) implies d
(
1, 0;αM
)
> 1/2, while d
(
1, 0;αM
)
< 1 is implied by pi (0) <
2pi (1), which holds. Thus, d
(
1, 0;αM
) ∈ (1/2, 1) . Monotonicity of d (1, 0; a) in α implies
d (1, 0;α) > d
(
1, 0;αM
)
,∀α < αM , i.e., store T strictly prefers to price-match.
Now consider store S, and suppose that store T price-matches. If store S does not price-
match, its profit will be (1− d (1, 0;α))pi (0), where d (1, 0;α) > 1/2, and its profit from
price-matching will be pi (1) /2. Store S’ best response is to retaliate if
(1− d (1, 0;α))pi (0) ≤ 1
2
pi (1)⇔ d (1, 0;α) ≥ d (1, 0;αN) = 1
2
(
1 +
pi(0)− pi(1)
pi (0)
)
.
Here pi(0) > pi(1) implies d
(
1, 0;αN
) ≥ 1/2, and d (1, 0;αN) ≤ 1 follows from pi (1) > 0.
Thus, d
(
1, 0;αN
) ∈ (1/2, 1) . As before, monotonicity of d (1, 0; a) in α implies that ∀α < αN
store S strictly prefers to price-match when store T price-matches, and for all α > αN store S
strictly prefers not to price-match. Moreover, pi (1) < pi (0) implies d
(
1, 0; aN
)
< d
(
1, 0;αM
)
.
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Since d (1, 0; a) is a strictly decreasing function of α, we have αN > αM .
Proof of Proposition 4: By demand independence the proof is identical to Proposition 1,
replacing β for the appropriate βi for i = {1, 2}. Assumption 2 suffices for the store to want
to sell both generics to consumers who discount them, and for some discounters to want to
buy them.
Proof of Proposition 5: Assume βH 6= γ (1− βL) / (γ (1− βL) + βL), so that price-
matching binds for one of the two goods leading to a lower price for the branded analogue.
Demand independence implies that the price of the generic substitute is again given by
Lemma 1, replacing for βi. Assumption 2 is sufficient for the store to want to sell the generic
to consumers who discount it, and for some discounters to want to buy it, regardless for
which good the price-matching binds.
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